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Abstract 
Network intrusion detection systems are an active area of research to identify threats that face computer 
networks. Network packets comprise of high dimensions which require huge effort to be examined effectively. As 
these dimensions contain some irrelevant features, they cause a high False Alarm Rate (FAR). In this paper, we 
propose a hybrid method as a feature selection, based on the central points of attribute values and an 
Association Rule Mining algorithm to decrease the FAR. This algorithm is designed to be implemented in a short 
processing time, due to its dependency on the central points of feature values with partitioning data records into 
equal parts. This algorithm is applied on the UNSW-NB15 and the NSLKDD data sets to adopt the highest 
ranked features. Some existing techniques are used to measure the accuracy and FAR. The experimental results 
show the proposed model is able to improve the accuracy and decrease the FAR. Furthermore, its processing 
time is extremely short.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Attackers attempt to breach computer networks to steal valuable information or disrupt computer resources. A 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is a powerful defence mechanism that can defend against hostile 
threats of attackers (Lee, Stolfo, & Mok, 1999). NIDS methodologies can be classified as Misuse Detection 
(MD) and Anomaly Detection (AD) (Moustafa & Slay, 2015a; Valdes & Anderson, 1995; Vigna & Kemmerer, 
1999). MD uses signatures of existing attacks to define known attacks. AD creates a normal profile of activities, 
and any strong deviations from this profile are considered as an attack. MD reduces False Alarm Rates (FAR), 
though it detects existing attacks only. Conversely, AD increases FAR, though it detects novel attacks. As a 
result, AD has become a critical point of research to reduce the FAR and increase the detection rate with 
identifying both existing and new attacks (Aziz, Azar, Hassanien, & Hanafy, 2014; Garcia-Teodoro, Diaz-
Verdejo, Maciá-Fernández, & Vázquez, 2009).  
Network packets consist of multiple features, due to the diversity of involved protocols and services. Some of 
these features are redundant or irrelevant. It can be observed that the redundant features are a major reason of 
increasing the FAR and decreasing the detection rate. A Feature Selection (FS) is a method of adopting the 
relevant features in a data set. The FS also reduces the computational time to implement an online NIDS. The 
reliable NIDS depends on removing noisy and redundant features (Hall, 1999). 
In this study, we suggest a hybrid method of the Central Points of attribute values and an Association Rule 
Mining (ARM) technique. First, the Central Points of attribute values (CP) method mean computing the most 
repeated values of each attribute either attribute type is numerical or categorical. Second, the ARM model was 
developed to generate the highest correlated values of observations in a data set (Agrawal, Imieliński, & Swami, 
1993; Zhang & Zhang, 2002), but we customise it as a feature selection. To establish an effective and reliable 
AD, the CP method computes the highest redundant values based on partitioning data observations into equal 
parts.as a consequence, this method reduces the processing time of executing the ARM technique.  
RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND 
The goal of ARM makes the strongest itemsets of features via computing support and confidence of rules 
(Agrawal et al., 1993; Lee & Stolfo, 1998; Yanyan & Yuan, 2010; Zhang & Zhang, 2002). Many studies have 
been suggested to apply ARM techniques in NIDSs. (Agrawal et al., 1993) proposed that program 
implementations and user activities can be correlated by using an ARM to create the most frequent attributes. 
(Lee & Stolfo, 1998) utilised the ARM to elicit rules for system audit data in order to build a normal user profile, 
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any deviation from the profile established new rules. However, in both these studies, the computational time of 
the ARM is extremely high. (Yanyan & Yuan, 2010) designed a partition-based ARM model. The model was 
customised to scan the training set twice. During the first scan, the data set was divided into several partitions to 
be executed easily in memory, whereas during the second scan, the itemsets of the training set were established. 
Though, the complexity of this algorithm is highly expensive. 
(Su, Yu, & Lin, 2009) developed an incremental fuzzy ARM technique. They used a linked-list method to store 
all candidate itemsets and their support in memory. The main disadvantage of this algorithm requires a large-size 
memory to store all candidate itemsets. (Nath, Bhattacharyya, & Ghosh, 2011) discussed a survey of existing 
feature selection approaches based on ARM methods. Some of the approaches used single objective functions, 
while others used with multi-objective. The results showed that the multi-objective ARM can be used to solve 
several real datasets. This study is partially related to our work to apply the ARM as feature selection. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE NSLKDD DATA SET  
A NSLKDD data set is an enhanced version of the KDD99 data set ("NSLKDD," 2015). This data set has four 
attack categories: DoS, U2R, R2L and probe; and contains 42 features. In the NSLKDD data set, three major 
problems were addressed. First, the repeated observations in training and testing sets were detached to exclude 
biasing classification techniques towards the most frequent observations. Second, the training set and testing set 
were generated by selecting observations from different parts of the original KDD99 data set. Finally, the 
imbalanced of observations in each class either in the training set or testing set were solved to decrease the FAR. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of attack and normal records in the NSLKDD data set for the training and testing 
sets.  
Table 1:  NSLKDD Data Set Distribution  
Category Training set Testing set 
DoS 45,927 7,458 
U2R 52 67 
R2L 995 2,887 
Probe 11,656 2,422 
Normal 67,343 9,710 
Total Records 125,973 22,544 
 
The NSLKDD data set has disadvantages which can negatively affect the fidelity of NIDS evaluation. First, 
attack data packets have a time to live value (TTL) of 126 or 253, whilst the packets of the network traffic 
mostly have a TTL of 127 or 254. However, TTL values of 126 and 253 do not happen in the training vectors of 
the attack types (McHugh, 2000). Second, the probability distribution of the testing set is different from the 
probability distribution of the training set, because of inserting new attack vectors in the testing set (Mahoney & 
Chan, 2003; Vasudevan, Harshini, & Selvakumar, 2011). This leads to skew or bias classification methods 
towards some records rather than balance between the attack and normal vectors. Third, the data set is out-dated; 
as a result, it does not a comprehensive representation of contemporary normal and attack vectors (Tavallaee, 
Bagheri, Lu, & Ghorbani, 2009).  
DESCRIPTION OF THE UNSW-NB15 DATA SET 
The UNSW-NB 15 ("UNSW-NB15 data set," 2015) data set was developed by using an IXIA tool to extract a 
hybrid of modern normal and modern attack behaviors. This data set involves nine attack categories and 49 
features (Moustafa & Slay, 2015b). This data set contains 2, 540,044 observations. A part of this data set was 
divided into training and testing sets, reflected in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: A Part of the UNSW-NB15 Data Set Distribution 
Category Training set Testing set 
Normal 56,000 37,000 
Analysis 2,000 677 
Backdoor 1,746 583 
DoS 12,264 4089 
Category Training set Testing set 
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Exploits 33,393 11,132 
Fuzzers 18,184 6,062 
Generic 40,000 18,871 
Reconnaissance 10,491 3,496 
Shellcode 1,133 378 
Worms 130 44 
Total Records 175,341 82,332 
 
The UNSW-NB15 data set has several advantages when compared to the NSLKDD data set. First, it contains 
real modern normal behaviors and contemporary synthesised attack activities. Second, the probability 
distribution of the training and testing sets are similar. Third, it involves a set of features from the payload and 
header of packets to reflect the network packets efficiently. Finally, the complexity of evaluating the UNSW-
NB15 on existing classification systems showed that this data set has complex patterns. This means that the data 
set can be used to evaluate the existing and novel classification methods in an effective and reliable manner.  
PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE FOR ADAPTIVE NIDS 
In this section, we describe the architecture of adopting the relevant features for each class, whether normal or 
abnormal, choose the training and testing sets, execute some classification methods as a decision engine and 
evaluate the outcome of the decision engine. Figure 1 represents the procedures of applying the architecture to 
execute an adaptive NIDS in a very short time processing as follows: 
 Choose an input data set, for example UNSW-NB15 or NSLKDD data set. 
 Execute Algorithm 1 to compute the Central Points (CP) of attribute values. 
 The CP output is the input of Algorithm 2 to calculate the high ranked attributes. 
 Divide the data set into two parts: training set and testing set to learn classifiers. 
 Apply EM clustering, Naïve Bayes and Logistic regression techniques as decision engines. 
 Evaluate the performance in terms of accuracy and FAR, with respect to the processing time. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Proposed Architecture for an Adaptive NIDS 
Central Points of Attribute Values 
To reduce the processing time, the data set records are divided into equal segmentations using Equation 1.  The 
purpose of the data set partitioning is to be easier during the processing and identify statistical characteristics, for 
example mean or mode, from different parts of records. This leads to accomplish the reliability of results by 
adopting the relevant attributes.  
 
𝑝 = # 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠
     (1) 
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 In each part of the data set, we compute the mode which is the most frequent value of a feature (Runnenburg, 
1978). The attribute values of a network data set could be numeric or categorical, as in the below example.  
An example to compute the mode of attribute values 
1. Numeric values 
X={1, 2, 1, 1, 3.2, 1}                >  mode = {1} 
---------------------------------------------------- 
2. Categorical values 
Y={‘tcp’, ‘udp’, ‘tcp’, ‘udp’}          >  mode = {‘udp’} 
In Algorithm 1, the central points of attribute values (mode) are described. In line 1 and 2, the for loops assign 
all data values. From line 3 to 12, check attribute values either categorical or numerical, and then compute the 
mode for each data part (p). Lines 13 to 17 repeat the steps until finishing all parts. Line 18 retrieves the mode of 
all data parts to be input for computing the ARM.  
 
 
Feature Selection ARM 
An ARM (Agrawal et al., 1993; Ma, 1998) is a data mining method to compute the correlation of two or more 
than two attributes in a data set, because it can find the strongest itemsets between observations. To explain the 
ARM, let 𝑟 = {𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3, … , 𝑓𝑁} be a set of features and D be a data set consisting of 𝑇 
transactions 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, … . , 𝑡𝑁. Each transaction 𝑡𝑗, ∀ 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑁 is a set of features such that  𝑡𝑗 ⊆ 𝑟. The 
association rule (𝑓1 (𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ⟹ 𝑓2(𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)) subjects to the constraints of (1)∃ 𝑡𝑗, 𝑓1, 𝑓2  ∈ 𝑡𝑗, 
(2)𝑓1 ⊆ 𝑟, 𝑓2  ⊆ 𝑟, and (3)𝑓1 ∩ 𝑓2 ∈ ∅. 
The ARM subjects to two methods: support and confidence to create rules. Support determines the frequency of 
row values that denotes the association percentage, as reflected in Equation (2). In Equation (3), confidence is 
the frequency of a precedent if the antecedent has already occurred. 
 
𝑠𝑢𝑝 (𝑓1 ⟹ 𝑓2) =
|#𝑡𝑗|𝑓1,𝑓2∈𝑡𝑗|
𝑁
    (2) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 (𝑓1 ⟹ 𝑓2) =
|#𝑡𝑗|𝑓1,𝑓2∈𝑡𝑗|
|# 𝑡𝑗|𝑓1∈𝑡𝑗|
    (3) 
 
The ARM finds out all repeated itemsets and identifies the strongest rules in the frequent itemsets. The strongest 
ARM in D is realised, if the support of a rule is greater than a user-specified minimum support (𝑠𝑢𝑝 ≥ min𝑠𝑢𝑝), 
and confidence of a rule is greater than minimum confidence thresholds (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 ≥ min𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓).   
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It is clear that the CP of attribute values of Algorithm 1 is considered as an input of Algorithm 2 to reduce the 
processing time. Algorithm 2 generates the highest ranked attributes based on the ARM. Line 1 is a loop to all 
CP. From line 2 to 14, check if the rules do not accomplish the ARM constraints, remove it. Otherwise, compute 
support and confidence. In Line 15, all rules order descending based on the values of support and confidence. 
From Line 17 to 21, the strongest features are selected based on the number of required features. 
 
Decision Engine Techniques 
In the Decision engine, we used Expectation-Maximisation (EM) clustering (Bradley, Fayyad, & Reina, 1998), 
Logistic Regression (LR) (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010) and Naïve Bayes (NB) (Panda & Patra, 2007) techniques. 
First, The EM technique maximises the probability density function of a Gaussian distribution to compute the 
mean and the covariance of each attribute in a data set. The EM clustering includes two steps: Expectation (E-
step) and Maximization (M). In the E-step, the likelihood of observation is calculated, while the M-step re-
estimates the parameter values from the E-step to accomplish the highest expected outcome.  Second, The NB is 
a conditional probability model which creates the classification of the two classes: normal (0) or attack (1). It is 
computed using the maximum a posterior, as denoted as:  
 
𝑃(𝐿|𝐼) = argmax
𝑤∈{1,2,..,𝑁}
𝑃(𝐿𝑤) ∏ 𝑃(𝐼𝑗|𝐿𝑤)
𝑁
𝑗=1
  (4) 
 
such that L denotes the label, I is the observation of each class, w is the class number, P(L|I) refers to the 
probability of the class given a specified observation and ∏ 𝑃(𝐼𝑗|𝐿𝑤)
𝑁
𝑗=1  is  multiplication of all the probabilities 
of the instances conditionally to their classes to achieve the maximum outcome. Third, the LR algorithm 
constructs the correlation between a dependent variable (L) and independent variables (F). It utilises the 
maximum likelihood function to estimate the regression parameters, as in Equation (4).  
Evaluation Criteria 
The classification measures are four elements: 𝑇𝑃, 𝑇𝑁, 𝐹𝑃 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑁. First,  𝑇𝑃 (true positive) is the number of 
correctly classified attacks. Second, 𝑇𝑁 (true negative) is the number of correctly classified normal records. 
Third, 𝐹𝑃 (false positive) is the number of misclassified attacks. Finally,  𝐹𝑁 (false negative) denotes the 
number of misclassified normal records.  The accuracy is the percentage of the correctly classified records over 
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all the rows of data set, whether correctly or incorrectly classified(Moustafa & Slay, 2015a), as reflected in the 
following Equation: 
𝑎𝑐𝑐 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 +  𝑇𝑁 +  𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
              (5) 
The False Alarm Rate (FAR) reflects the rate of the misclassified to classified records, as in Equation (8). 
Equations (6) and (7) calculate False Positive Rate (FPR) and the False Negative Rate (FNR), respectively.  
𝐹𝑃𝑅 =
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
                                     (6) 
               𝐹𝑁𝑅 =
𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃
                                      (7) 
               𝐹𝐴𝑅 =
𝐹𝑃𝑅 + 𝐹𝑁𝑅
2
                                 (8) 
Precision and recall are computed, as in Equations (9) (10). The precision is the fraction of correctly classified 
attacks to all attack records. On the other hand, the recall is the fraction of correctly classified attacks to the 
number of correctly classified attacks and misclassified attacks. 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑡𝑝
𝑡𝑝 + 𝑓𝑝
                                   (9) 
 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
𝑡𝑝
𝑡𝑝 + 𝑓𝑛
                                          (10) 
 
The Equations (5) to (8) evaluate the efficiency and reliability of the Decision engine. It is acknowledged that the 
highest trusted detection is accomplished, when the accuracy value closes to 100% and FAR closes to 0%.  
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The hybrid feature selection is developed using Visual studio C# 2008. Each data set divided into equal parts 
using Equation 1. The UNSW-NB15 data set involves 5601 partitions. In contrast, the NSLKDD involves 3072 
partitions. Figure 2 represents the construction of the central points of each attribute values, with respect to the 
processing time. The parts of the UNSW-NB15 data set consumed about 2 minutes to calculate the most frequent 
values for each feature. Conversely, the parts of the NSLKDD data set consumed about 1.4 minutes. This CP 
algorithm iteratively generates the highest repeated values to reduce the cost of generating support and 
confidence of the ARM. 
 
 
Figure 2: Data Set Segmentations vs. Processing Time 
 
Algorithm 2 is executed with three different values of minsup and minconf: 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 to estimate the 
reliability of outcomes. The goal of selecting these values is that the results of probability could be low (0 - 0.4), 
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median (0.4 - 0.6) or high (0.61- 1). Therefore, we consider that the low, median and high probabilities may be 
up to 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 in average, respectively. We select some rules based on these probabilities to generate the 
most important rules. In Figure 3, some rules and their importance are elicited to choose a set of features for each 
class either normal (0) and attack (1).  The importance of rules equals the average of support and confidence of a 
rule.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: A part Of The ARM On The Two Data Sets 
 
Finally, the highest generated attributes from the association rule are ranked. We adopted the highest 11 
attributes to ensure at least 25% of all features will be used in the decision engine, as reflected in Table 3. We 
attempted to select less than 11 attributes, the evaluation of decision engine techniques were extremely 
unsatisfactory. Therefore, it can be observed that 25% of features consider a reliable outcome because all 
features are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.).  Table 3 includes the selected 11 features for the 
UNSW-NB15 and the NSLKDD data sets. 
 
                                             Table 3: The Adopted Features of the Two Data Sets 
 
 
The evaluation criteria of executing the Expectation-Maximisation clustering (EM), the Logistic Regression 
(LR) and the Naïve Bayes (NB) are calculated in terms of accuracy and False Alarm Rate (FAR) to evaluate the 
complexity of these data sets, as referred in Table 4.   
 
Table 4: The Evaluation of the Two Data Sets 
 UNSW-NB15 NSLKDD 
 Accuracy FAR Accuracy FAR 
EM 77.2 13.1 74.4 14.2 
LR 83.0 14.2 82.1 17.5 
NB 79.5 23.5 28.9 61.4 
 
UNSW-NB15 Features NSLKDD Features 
state dst_bytes 
Dttl dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate 
synack srv_diff_host_rate 
swin land 
dwin dst_host_same_src_port_rate 
ct_state_ttl count 
ct_src_ltm src_bytes 
ct_srv_dst logged_in 
Sttl protocol_type 
ct_dst_sport_ltm num_root 
Djit srv_rerror_rate 
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The LR produces the best results on the two data sets. On the contrary, the NB reflects the worst outcome on the 
two data sets. In a general overview, the accuracy and FAR of these techniques on the UNSW-NB15 attributes 
are better than the NSLKDD attributes. Further, in the techniques, the precision and recall on the UNSW-NB15 
data set are higher than on the NSLKDD data set, as shown in Figure 4.   
 
 
Figure 4: Precision and Recall of the Two Data Sets 
 
To clarify why UNSW-NB15 data set has a better assessment than the NSLKDD, there are two main reasons. 
First, the NSLKDD data set has many features have the majority of value ‘0’ whether in the observations of 
normal or abnormal, so the decision engine techniques are not able to distinguish between normal and attack 
observations. However, the UNSW-NB15 has a wide variety of values that represent the nature of modern real 
network in which these values are similar for attack and normal records. Second, the data distribution of 
NSLKDD data set in the training and testing set is different, due to the addition of new attacks to the testing set. 
Conversely, the data distribution of UNSW-NB15 data set in the training and testing set is similar, because of all 
observations were generated from a same test-bed.  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we propose a hybrid feature selection technique based on the central points (CP) of attribute values 
and Association Rule Mining (ARM). The CP helps to reduce the processing time overall by selecting the most 
frequent values. The ARM is customised to choose the highest ranked features by removing irrelevant or noisy 
features. This algorithm is executed on the UNSW-NB15 and the NSLKDD data set. To discriminate between 
attack and normal records, the EM clustering, Logistic Regression and Naïve Bayes are used. The results show 
that, the evaluation of the UNSW-NB15 data set is better than the NSLKDD. Ultimately, the proposed feature 
selection technique has two advantages: reduce processing time and improve the evaluation of decision engines.  
In the future, we plan to enhance the algorithm by adding steps that help in reducing the processing time of 
similar values. 
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